This paper argues that the moral rightness of an act is a reason to perform it. I argue against those who think that only an act's right-making features can be reasons to perform it. After noting some grounds on which one might think that my view is obviously correct, I respond to the main argument against it, which relies on an intuition of redundancy or "double-counting". I show that this argument drastically overgenerates, and I suggest that it is based on a confused picture of moral metaphysics. I then offer a way to revise our understanding of the redundancy intuition such that it makes no silly metaphysical assumptions, and avoids the overgeneration problem, but also no longer challenges my view.
This paper is in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 14. I previously presented it at the UNAM Graduate Conference 2018, the Central APA 2018, the Madison Metaethics Workshop 2017, the Princeton-Michigan Metanormativity Workshop 2017, and the Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference 2017. I am very grateful to participants in all these discussions for their formative feedback.